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Effective governance of natural resources is a key challenge facing many developing nations. There is 
general agreement that without effective institutions, resources will be underprovided and overused. What is less 
certain, however, is what these institutions might be and who ought to provide them. Should governments take 
the lead in supplying institutions and organizing collective action, should this task be resolved through market 
forces, or should resource users of a "common pool resource" be encouraged to take the lead? This paper 
presents the view that it is difficult for external actors to design optimal institutions and enforce rules at low cost 
because solutions tend to be conditional and situation specific. Therefore, local resource users are better 
equipped to develop or be major participants in developing institutional solutions. Support for this idea is drawn 
from empirical studies of irrigation systems in Nepal. Comparisons of the performance of farmer-managed 
irrigation systems with that of agency-managed irrigation systems show that the former consistently out perform 
the latter on most performance measures. This paper offers two key insights: developing effective institutions is 
as important as developing physical infrastructure and local resource users may be able to offer better insti-
tutional solutions under certain conditions than government agencies when resources are local in scale. 
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Introduction 
Effective governance of irrigation systems is cru-
cial to Nepal, which has predominantly an agrarian 
economy that is dependent on irrigated paddy cul-
tivation to feed a growing population. Year-round 
irrigation is available for less than 20% of the 2.2 
million hectares of land area that could be irrigated 
(Shah and Singh, 2001), and therefore more effec-
tive irrigation could greatly expand agricultural 
production, which currently contributes 38% of 
the gross domestic product (Ministry of Finance, 
2006). While there is no dispute in recognizing the 
importance of irrigation, there are intense disagree-
ments over how irrigation infrastructure ought to 
be developed and governed. Some believe that 
governments are necessary in order to supply and 
organize collective action, while others believe that 
this task is best done by self-governed resource 
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users. 
The Nepali State's involvement in the provision 
of irrigation infrastructure has been substantial. 
However, the performance of agency-managed irri-
gation systems (AMIS) is unsatisfactory relative to 
the resources invested in the sector (NPC, 1994). 
Failure to provide an assured supply of water, to 
get water to farmers at the tail end, and to achieve 
economies of scale in construction, operation, and 
maintenance are among the most consistently cited 
problems. Interestingly, many of these problems 
observed in AMIS are a result of poorly designed 
institutions i.e. rules in use rather than of poorly 
designed infrastructure. 
Farmer-managed irrigation systems (FMIS), in 
contrast, are reported to perform relatively well 
(Lam, 1998). In a systematic study, Lam showed 
that FMIS outperformed AMIS on most key pa-
rameters - agricultural yield, cropping intensities, 
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and ability to get water to the tail end. The 
potential of FMIS is no doubt substantial, but not 
every FMIS is successful. There are some settings 
where appropriators are able to self-organize suc-
cessfully and other settings where they are not. 
Since many variables can jointly affect the benefits 
and costs of organization, predicting the emergence 
or lack of self-organization simply by looking at the 
presence or absence of a set of resources and user 
attribu tes is not a trivial task (Ostrom, 200 I). This 
paper examines some of the attributes of and re-
source settings in FMIS in Nepal to explain how 
they have influenced the ability of farm com-
munities to self-organize. Such an explanation 
should allow for the design of policies that can 
strengthen institutional and governance capabilities 
of FMIS. 
The paper is organized into five parts. Part I 
presents an overview of the irrigation sector and its 
performance in Nepal. Part II explores the incen-
tive structures facing fanners in self-organized 
versus agency-managed systems and examines why 
farmers in the former systems may be better 
motivated than those in the latter. Part III com-
pares the performance of AMIS and FMIS. Part 
IV presents research results and explores how some 
of the attributes of resource users, attributes of 
physical resources, and resource setting can affect 
cooperation and performance in self-organized sys-
tems. The conclusions and lessons that can be 
learned to improve irrigation performance are then 
presented at the end in Part V. 
Irrigation Development and 
Planning in Nepal 
Nepal has a total cultivated area of 2.6 million 
hectares. Although 85 % of this area has potential 
for irrigated agriculture, only 1.1 million hectares 
(42 %) is covered by irrigation infrastructure 
(Shah and Singh, 2001; NENCID, 2007). Surface 
water is used to irrigate 900,000 ha and ground-
water (mainly in Terai) to irrigate 200,000 ha. 
Year-round irrigation is available to only 38 % of 
the irrigated areas. Most (75 %) of the irrigated 
areas are serviced by FMIS and the remaining 
(25%) by AMIS (NENCID, 2007). 
The vast majority of the irrigation infrastructure 
developed until the mid-1950s was constructed and 
managed by farmers. During this period, there was 
some state involvement but it was limited (Shah 
and Singh, 2001). Chandra and Juddha Nahars 
(canals) were among the first public sector irriga-
tion projects undertaken by the national govern-
ment in 1923 and 1946, respectively. State budgets 
were also allocated to construct and maintain a few 
raj kulos or royal canals (Regmi, 1978). It was 
only after 1956 that plan~ed modes of irrigation 
development were initiated by the Government 
through its five-year plans. Despite government 
involvement, even today, FMIS contribute three 
times as much toward irrigated agriculture than do 
AMIS. 
Irrigation infrastructure development from 1956 
to 1980 initially focused on the construction of 
medium- and large-scale projects. It then gradually 
moved toward the intensification of existing com-
mand areas through the expansion and rehabilita-
tion of existing infrastructure. Program implemen-
tation during this period was very centralized. Irri-
gation officials assumed all planning, construction, 
operation and management, and maintenance re-
sponsibilities. Beneficiaries were not involved. 
Only after 1985 did the government begin to take a 
more integrated approach to developing land and 
water resources, and, unlike earlier times, more 
emphasis began to be placed by Government on 
user involvement in the irrigation process (Shah 
and Singh, 2001; Angood et al., 2002). 
The policy reforms undertaken by Government 
to adopt a participatory approach to irrigation de-
velopment are reflected in documents such as the 
Water Resources Act 1992 and the updated Irriga-
tion Policy 2003 (Water Aid Nepal 2005). The 
policy sets out objectives and guidelines for irriga-
tion interventions, including FMIS development 
and management and transfer of Department of 
Irrigation (DOI)-constructed systems to water user 
associations (WUAs) (Water Aid Nepal, 2005). 
The irrigation policy, which was initially adopted in 
1992, has explicit provisions for supporting com-
munity efforts in irrigation development and for 
encouraging more user participation in agency-led 
irrigation development programs. The Water Re-
sources Act 1992 also provides a legal basis for 
implementing participatory development programs 
as it recognizes the rights of WUAs. Another 
important document is the Government's 20-year 
(1995-2015) Agricultural Perspective Plan (NPC, 
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1995), which identifies irrigation as the primary 
input for increasing agricultural productivity and 
recognizes FMIS as a key vehicle for delivering the 
input. 
Irrigation Performance 
An estimated US $1.2 billion was spent in the 
irrigation sector from 1956 to 2000 (Shah and 
Singh, 2001). Only 20% of this amount was 
funded through the government's resources; the 
remaining 80% was funded by external donors. 
The Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and 
Saudi Development Fund were the major donor 
agencies. Nearly 60% of these funds were spent on 
constructing new irrigation infrastructure. Despite 
a standing policy since the mid-1980s to prioritize 
the rehabilitation and expansion of FMIS net-
works, the DOl has invested only about 16% in this 
area (Shah and Singh, 2001). 
DOl investments in medium- and large-scale pro-
jects have been disappointing. Shah and Singh 
(2001) reported that water volumes supplied by 
many large projects such as Sunsari-Morang, 
Bagamti, and Narayani are far below original 
plans, and the projects consistently have capital 
cost over-runs. Son1e projects, such as Bagmati and 
Babai, are reported to have cost over $5,000/ha to 
construct. The 1994 appraisal by the National 
Planning Commission of irrigation development 
performance in the country was also negative, 
reporting "irrigation development and operation in 
Nepal is performing dismally relative to the amount 
of resources poured into the sector" (NPC, 1994). 
There are many reasons for such poor perform-
ance, but the ones that are more frequently 
reported are (a) weak governance framework and 
weak enforcement in attaining effective service de-
livery; (b) unrealistic productivity projections in 
assessing benefit-cost ratios; (c) poor system man-
agement; (d) insufficient operation and manage-
ment due to lack of user participation; and (e) poor 
understanding of farmer priorities (ADB, 2001). 
The institutional arrangements to induce realistic 
project planning and effective system management 
are, obviously, weak. 
Intervention by governmen t agencies to improve 
FMIS has also run into difficulties. Ostrom (1992, 
2002) pointed out that these difficulties often arise 
because irrigation agencies fail to recognize the 
institutional aspect of irrigation systems and focus 
only on improving physical capital. To emphasize 
her point, Ostrom cited the experience of the 
USAID-funded Chiregad Irrigation Project in 
Dang, as reported by Hilton (2002). A new irriga-
tion system with permanent headworks and 
cement-lined canals was constructed in an area that 
was previously irrigated by five FMIS. Making no 
effort to understand how the pre-existing water 
associations were organized, DOl appointed a new 
user committee that failed to include any of the 
water managers of the five FMIS. The outcome of 
this intervention was that only three of the five 
maujas (villages) received water consistently. 
Prior to the intervention, all five maujas used to 
receive adequate water. The effort to improve 
agricultural productivity through investments in 
physical capital alone thus resulted in reduction of 
the service area, unreliable water delivery, a non-
functional WUA, and a weakened older WUA. 
Institutional structures stand on social capital 
developed over many years of learning through 
shared experiences and are as real as physical capi-
tal. Their neglect, as we see in this example, not 
only resulted in weakening of farmer organizations 
but also led to adverse outcomes. 
Motivation to Self-organize 
- FMIS versus AMIS 
A self-organized system can be structurally 
better at generating positive incentives than exter-
nally organized systems. In a self-organized sys-
tem, such as the FMIS, the farmers collectively 
construct and govern their own systems. They 
make decisions on delineating service areas, deter-
mining water allocation rules, and assigning main-
tenance responsibilities. In externally designed sys-
tems, such as the AMIS, someone other than the 
farmers designs the physical system and assumes 
responsibility for making rules and enforcing them. 
Government officials who are tasked with manag-
ing these systems, however, have to govern on 
shoestring budgets and with limited manpower. 
Without much incentive to develop long-term 
working relationships with the farmers and faced 
with resource constraints, many try to develop 
simple uniform allocation rules across the board 
and often neglect to enforce them. Given the 
farmers' diverse cropping schedules and needs, 
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such uniform rules are mostly inadequate, and, 
without enforcement, the stage is set for breaking 
rules. When "official rules" do not match local 
needs, then conflicts break out, canals are breached, 
and physical capital is destroyed (Lam, 1998). 
In more recent times irrigation policy has en-
couraged "turnover" and "joint management" of 
AMIS to formal WUAs to improve irrigation oper-
ations (Shivakoti and Ostrom, 2002). However, 
very little attention tends to be given by govern-
ment officials in forming strong WUAs, and these 
associations are often seen as arrangements by 
them to obtain a community's cooperation. Little 
is done to either encourage or develop the govern-
ing function of these organizations. Officials (pro-
fessional engineers) who oversee this process are 
not motivated and often not skilled to serve the 
needs of the farmers. Engineers are more interest-
ed in the construction part of the process rather 
than in the operation and management function. 
And, institutional aspects of irrigation system 
design are often his/her weak point as it is not a 
strong component of engineering training. The 
farmers, too, are not confident about the transfer 
process and are unwilling to invest their time in 
operating the system. A tendency to shirk on the 
part of the officials as well as a tendency to free-ride 
on the part of the farmers often results in the poor 
performance of AMIS. 
Farmers in successful FMIS tend to overcome 
their collective action problems by crafting their 
own rules (Ostrom, 1992; Shivakoti and Ostrom, 
2002). The conditions that are necessary to initiate 
collective action, however, do not arise spontane-
ously. Unless farmers have a common shared un-
derstanding of the costs and benefits of engaging in 
collective action, unless a secure property agree-
ment regime makes it possible for them to reap the 
benefits of their efforts in the long run, and unless 
they are confident that external authorities will not 
interfere in their rule making, implementation, and 
enforcement activities, farmers will not invest their 
efforts in organizing for the long term. Simply 
turning over systems to the farmers and expecting 
viable organizations to take root is expecting too 
much. To craft rules that suit a particular environ-
ment, there has to be an understanding of the 
inter-relationships between the rules and the physi-
cal, social, and cultural environments. 
Comparing FMIS and AMIS Performance 
There are many individual case study reports by 
authors who assert that FMIS in Nepal perform 
better than AMIS. Lam (1998) undertook a sys-
tematic and comprehensive study of 127 Nepali 
irrigation systems and reached the same conclusion. 
In the following sections, I review his results and 
those of a few others to underscore Ostrom's 
(1990) idea that self-organized resource users may 
be better able to resolve cooperation dilemmas (or 
be a major part in their resolution) when resources 
are local in scale. In other words, external actors 
may face more difficulties than local resource users 
in designing optimal institutional solutions and en-
forcing rules at lower cost. 
Lam used three measures of irrigation perform-
ance - agricultural productivity, water delivery, 
and physical condition - to compare performance 
between FMIS and AMIS. All of his measures are 
composite indices derived from multiple variables. 
Agricultural productivity atten1pts to capture the 
productive potential of a group resulting from their 
collective action efforts. Water delivery measures 
the ability of a system to deliver water adequately, 
reliably, and equitably. Physical condition is a 
measure of how well an irrigation system is being 
maintained. Comparing FMIS and AMIS along 
each of these three dimensions, Lam found that 
FMIS, on average, had higher levels of agricultural 
productivity, maintained their infrastructures bet-
ter, and delivered water more effectively than 
AMIS. These differences are statistically signifi-
cant. 
Two other relevant results that Lam reported are 
that rule following among appropriators is sig-
nificantly greater in FMIS than AMIS, and levels of 
mutual trust are higher in FMIS. More than 50% 
of the FMIS are characterized by high levels of rule 
following, but only 20% of AMIS; rule infractions 
are of a minor nature in 9 out of 10 FMIS but in 5 
out of 10 AMIS; and farmers trust fellow farmers 
nearly twice as much in FMIS than in AMIS. The 
reason why FMIS are able to perform better than 
AMIS is probably because the rules adopted by the 
former are better able to distribute the benefits and 
costs more equitably among the users than the 
latter. This is reflected in the higher levels of trust 
and greater rule-following behavior observed in 
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FMIS than in AMIS. 
Another study by Ostrom and Gardner (1993), 
based on large number of cases, also suggested that 
FMIS are better able to deliver water to their tail 
ends than AMIS. Water is generally most abun-
dant in river courses during the monsoon season. 
In spring and winter, however, water tends to be 
scarcer. Water is the most critical agricultural 
input for Nepali farmlands, and crop yields and 
cropping intensities are mostly a function of its 
availability. Therefore, the ability of irrigation 
systems to deliver water to their tail ends across the 
seasons is a strong indicator of irrigation perform-
ance. Comparing FMIS and AMIS on this meas-
ure, Ostrom and Gardner (1993) found that FMIS 
consistently outperforms AM IS across the seasons. 
Their results show that three times as many FMIS 
were able to provide abundant water to their tail 
ends than were AMIS during winter and spring. 
Studies of 160 FMIS in Tanahu (Poudel et al., 
1994) and of 88 FMIS in Chitwan (Shukla et al., 
1993) also indicated that FMIS are able to produce 
more spring paddy rice (4 t/ha/y and 4.6 t/ha/y, 
respectively) than the national average (2.28 t/ha/ 
y). 
The above results indicate that farmers in self-
organized irrigation systems are capable of per-
forming better than their counterparts in externally 
managed systems. This does not mean, however, 
that farmers are always successful at self-organ-
ization. There is general agreement among com-
mon pool resource scholars that appropriators who 
are dependent on a resource, intend to use their 
resources over a long time, have achieved certain 
levels of trust, and possess some level of autonomy 
to make their own rules are more likely to self-
organize (Ostrom et at 1994; Bromley, 1992; McCay 
and Acheson, 1987). Whether they are actually 
able to do so, however, depends on how attributes 
of the resource and attributes of the users interact 
in specific field settings to affect the perceived costs 
and benefits of organizing (Ostrom, 1999). In the 
following section, I examine how some of the re-
source attributes and resource user attributes may 
influence the performance of FMIS in specific re-
source settings. 
FMIS Performance in Chitwan 
- Research Results 
This section draws heavily on a study of 74 FMIS 
in Chitwan, Nepal (Regmi, 2007). In Chitwan, 
there are two distinct types of river systems: north-
south (N-S) and east-west (E-W) flowing. Rivers 
that flow N -S originate from the Mahabharat Hills 
and pass through changing terrain from hills to 
plains. These rivers are characterized by steep 
gradients, seasonal flows, changing course, low-
discharge volumes, and difficult terrain (Pradhan, 
1989). Irrigation systems drawing water from 
these rivers tend to have longer canals, pass 
through landslide zones, and require frequent 
maintenance of diversion structures. E-W rivers, 
on the other hand, are characterized by flat terrain, 
mild gradients, perennial flows, and high discharge 
volumes. Irrigation systems on these rivers enjoy 
an advantage over the other systems in the ease 
with which appropriators can draw water. The N-S 
and E-W groupings reflect distinct resource set-
tings. In addition, system variations occur with 
respect to group size, ethnic composition, exit op-
tions, in-group income differences, and many other 
variables. Within this context, local resource users 
have to organize and craft rules that allow them to 
maintain their resources and ensure equitable re-
source distribution. 
Performance of an FMIS in Chitwan tends to be 
strongly associated with the orientation of the river 
system from which it draws its water. As pointed 
out above, the characteristics of a river system have 
a direct bearing on the amount of effort required to 
operate and maintain a system and the volume of 
resource available. This is reflected in the ability of 
E-W irrigation systems to draw water for more 
months in a year, maintain their infrastructures 
better, and enjoy higher cropping intensities. 
Whereas all E-W irrigation systems are able to take 
water for more than 9 months of the year, only one 
out of four N-S systems are able to do this. Also, 
agricultural productivity and infrastructure in E-W 
systems are better than those in N -S systems by 
factors of 1.25 and 1.18, respectively. 
The above results, however, do not necessarily 
mean that E-W systems are better governed than 
N-S systems. In fact, higher levels of rule-following 
behavior are observed in N-S systems than in E-W 
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systems, and the differences are significant (X2 = 
3.185, P=0.074). This suggests that less-well-
endowed resource systems (N-S) may be more 
rigorous at fine-tuning operational rules and follow-
ing them than their better-endowed counterparts. 
The larger implication of this result, though, is 
associated with self-organization. Resource users, 
even in the absence of a conducive environment, 
may be able to self-organize and develop effective 
agreements when the benefits of organizing are 
commonly understood. 
Irrigation performance was also found to be 
influenced by the willingness of individuals in 
groups to assume leadership or entrepreneurial ac-
tivities and a group's history of prior organizational 
experiences. One in five E-W systems reported 
weak leadership roles versus three in five N-S sys-
tems. Similarly, some history of cooperation in 
activities other than irrigation was reported in eight 
of ten E-W systems versus three of ten N-S systems. 
These differences in leadership and organizational 
activities associate positively and significantly with 
irrigation performance. Unless individuals are will-
ing to invest substantial amounts of their personal 
time and energy in coordinating activities of the 
many users, it may not be possible to craft workable 
institutions. Making, testing, fine-tuning, interpret-
ing, and monitoring and enforcing rules to struc-
ture irrigation activities is a continuous process and 
requires substantial amounts time and energy. 
Ternstrom (2002) also reported a significant rela-
tionship between leadership abilities and perform-
ance in her study of irrigation systems. Any type of 
prior organizational history is important. Familiar-
ity with various rules and strategies used to achieve 
various forms of regulations make the task of or-
ganization a bit easier, as users are more likely to 
agree upon rules whose operation they understand 
from prior experience. 
Results from Chitwan also indicate that there is 
no correlation between socio-cultural differences 
as reflected by a group's ethnic composition and 
irrigation performance; a negative correlation be-
tween income variation and performance; and no 
correlation between the size of an irrigation system 
as measured by its command area and perform-
ance. The results suggest that variations in income 
within groups may be a greater impediment to 
self-organization than the number of ethnicities 
that comprise a group. The socio-cultural result 
is in line with the studies of Fujita et al. (2000), 
Gautam (2002), and Somanathan et al. (2002): 
they too did not find any association between their 
measures of socio-cultural heterogeneity and collec-
tive action. The results in income variation and size 
are similar to those of Tang (1992), Lam (1998), 
and Ternstrom (2002): a negative correlation be-
tween income inequality and collective action and 
no correlation between size and collective activity. 
One might expect better coordination and collec-
tive action when system size is small, but this 
appears not to be the case. 
The effects of engineering infrastructure i.e., 
the type of headwork or canal lining - on irriga-
tion performance appear not to be uniform. The 
presence of a sturdier and more permanent type of 
headwork on a system appears to be negatively 
correlated with performance. A sturdier cement-
lined canal, on the other hand, is positively cor-
related with system performance. Although the 
results are not statistically significant, their implica-
tions very much are. A truly permanent headwork, 
ironically, generates disincentives for head enders 
to cooperate with tail-enders in system maintenance 
(Lam, 1998). Partial or complete cement lining, on 
the other hand, appears to improve performance by 
minimizing water losses, thereby enabling water to 
reach the tail ends. The policy implications of such 
results are that improvements in engineering infra-
structure alone may not necessarily translate into 
improved system performance. Unless users are 
able to craft and enforce rules that can cope with 
the asymmetries generated by improvements in irri-
gation infrastructure, the positive effects may well 
be cancelled out by the negative effects. 
Conclusion 
Irrigation systems face a variety of challenges. 
The terrain can be difficult, rivers can be unruly, 
group members may belong to diverse cultural 
backgrounds, group sizes can vary, asset endow-
ments may differ, and interests may differ within 
groups. Given these constraints, an irrigation 
system has to be able to solve the fundamental 
problems of provisioning and appropriation as-
sociated with common pool resources. Intakes and 
canals have to be constructed and maintained regu-
larly, and working rules have to be crafted to reflect 
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appropriation rights and responsibilities. Such ac-
tivities, which consume lots of energy and require 
the mobilization of significant resources, might be 
undertaken more effectively by self-governed 
groups than by centralized government agencies. 
The arguments for government interventions are 
often based on the premises that flimsy infrastruc-
tures used by farmers result in waste, group differ-
ences within a community prevent farmers from 
self-organizing, increasing group sizes and com-
mand areas make it more difficult for farmers to 
reach effective agreements among themselves, and 
larger integrated systems result in economies of 
scale. Empirical results from the field, however, 
suggest otherwise. Despite considerable group het-
erogeneity, farmers are able to organize; even with 
flimsy infrastructure, they are able to outperform 
AMIS with superior infrastructure; and they are 
able to reach agreements even when group size or 
command area is large. These results underscore 
Ostrom's (2002, 2005) observation that there is a 
strong institutional aspect to irrigation systems, and 
focusing only on improving physical capital may 
not result in improved irrigation performance. 
Although FMIS potential may be substantial, not 
every FMIS is successful. Some resource settings 
tend to be more conducive to self-organization than 
others. Systems with difficult topography - N-S 
systems - face far more organizational challenges 
than systems with favorable topography. However, 
the abilities of groups to craft rules and their will-
ingness to monitor and enforce them can, to a great 
extent, overcome the problems associated with ini-
tial resource endowments. The lack of leadership 
abilities or prior organizational history, in fact, can 
turn out to be more detrimental to self-organization 
and irrigation performance than poor initial re-
source endowments, ethnic differences, or even the 
presence of permanent irrigation infrastructure. 
Understanding how different variables interact in 
different settings can help in designing policies that 
can strengthen institutional and governance 
capabilities of FMIS. 
There are many dimensions to the basis for coop-
eration among individuals. Individual common-
pool resource users are likely to contribute and 
cooperate only if they perceive that they will be able 
to reap the long-term benefits of engaging in collec-
tive action. They are also more likely to cooperate 
if they are aware of their interdependence and see 
mutual benefits resulting from working together. 
The presence of a set of credible, commonly under-
stood, well-enforced, and agreed-upon rules further 
helps in generating a positive incentive system for 
villagers to engage in collective action. Without 
creating the right environment, bureaucracies can-
not assume that cooperation among resource users 
will develop naturally once an irrigation system has 
been handed over to them. Creating the right 
environment requires bureaucracy to emphasize in-
stitution building, engage local resource users in all 
aspects of irrigation development, and ensure their 
legal standing. Common pool resource systems are 
coproduction processes that perform best when 
both the oversight agencies and resource users co-
operate in making the system work. 
Farmers in Chitwan have been able to overcome 
collective action problems and are fairly successful 
at managing water resources in their unique set-
tings. This implies that, even though it is difficult, 
it is possible for resource users with a supportive 
political system to locally overcome what are as-
sumed to be severe collective-action problems. If 
external assistance is geared toward supporting the 
farmers' efforts to develop their own institutions, 
this could result in enhanced water security and 
improved irrigation performance. 
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